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In 1976 Michel Foucault elaborated the so called war-model as a schema for understanding power and politics in his lectures ‘Society must be defended’. The 
war model should allow an apprehension of social and political life as incessant 
struggle and confrontation, strategic and tactical manoeuvring: ‘it is war that 
makes society intelligible’ (Foucault 2003, 163). Yet more importantly perhaps, 
the war model should allow leaving behind the liberal-juridical model, a model 
that considers questions of power and politics as questions of legitimacy and 
illegitimacy. Legal systems, too, need to be analysed ‘in terms of the unending 
movement – which has no historical end – of the shifting relations that make 
some dominant over others’ (Foucault 2003, 109). 
The system of right and the judiciary field are permanent vehicles for relations 
of domination, and for polymorphous techniques of subjugation. Right must, 
I think, be viewed not in terms of a legitimacy that has to be established, but 
in terms of the procedures of subjugation it implements. (Foucault 2003, 27.)
Three years later, in The birth of biopolitics lectures of 1979, Foucault seems to have 
radically changed his views on the law. Now, modern law stands for a limitation 
of power rather than its instrument: ‘Legal theory and judicial institutions no 
longer serve as the multiplier, but rather as the subtractor of royal power’. Juridical 
theories speak of ‘fundamental laws of the state’ that ‘exists, as it were, before 
the state since they are constitutive of the state’ and cannot be tampered with. 
The law is not mere ideology, but facilitates real resistance: ‘let’s say that in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries public law is oppositional’. The power of 
the state is opposed by way of attempts to impose limits on its exercise ‘and the 
principle or reason of this limitation is found in juridical reason’. (Foucault 2008, 
8-9.)
From 1976 to 1979 there seems to have occurred a change, and this change 
seems to be radical in Foucault’s thinking. It also seems that in the background 
of this change there is another change: Foucault seems to have abandoned war 
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as the model and the principle of intelligibility of society, politics and power. 
Something had replaced it, something that Foucault called governmentality (la 
gouvernementalité) (Foucault 2007a). This suggests that the war model, and its 
rejection of the legal model, was only a passing episode or an isolated experiment 
that had no long-lasting resonance for Foucault. Yet this is far from the truth. 
Even at the beginning of his so called genealogical phase, in a programmatic text 
of 1971 entitled Nietzsche, genealogy, history, he had set out from the view that the 
legal system is a depository of wars and violence: ‘humanity installs each of its 
violences in a system of rules and thus proceeds from domination to domination’ 
(Foucault 1998, 378). Towards the end of his life, in an interview from 1981, he 
indicated that the problem of war and law still bothered him and that he would 
like to return to it:
And if God grants me life, after madness, illness, crime, sexuality, the last thing 
that I would like to study would be the problem of war and the institution of 
war in what one could call the military dimension of society. There again I 
would have to cross into the problem of law […]. (Foucault 2007b, 143.)
So there are reasons to believe that the war model was sustained throughout 
the seventies, albeit it receded to the background and did not surface at the level 
of Foucault’s methodical vocabulary in the foreground. Yet it is a well known 
hermeneutic truth that background is important in understanding foreground. 
The idea of the following piece of exegesis is that the war model still worked in 
the background when Foucault discussed liberal economics as a current end-point 
of the history of governmentality in his Birth of biopolitics lectures. My suggestion 
is that Foucault considered contemporary liberal economics as a technology of 
governing whose effect was that war-like battle is generalised in economic form. 
This technology builds on a specific war-rationality, the eidos of competition that 
in our societies disseminates all over, penetrates all corners of social life. 
With respect to its culture and ethos, economic rationality belongs his-
torically to the bourgeois and is of course antagonistic and disparate with the 
warrior values represented by the old aristocracy. Yet it is clear that the eidos of 
competition really also corresponds to the structures of warrior society in that 
both extol and celebrate the ferocity of private individuals as actors for whom 
only their own success matters. To make the correspondence visible, the notion 
of battle-form shows that the life of societies and of individuals is ultimately seen 
as war by Foucault.
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The problem: how to institutionalise competition?
In ‘Society must be defended’, Foucault explained the ‘liberal conception of political 
power’ in the following way:
In the case of the classic juridical theory of power, power is regarded as a right 
which can be possessed in the way one possesses a commodity and which can 
therefore be transferred or alienated, either completely or partly, through a 
juridical act or an act that founds a right – it does not matter which, for the 
moment – thanks to the surrender of something or thanks to a contract. Power 
is the concrete power that any individual can hold, and which he can surrender, 
either as a whole, or in parts as to constitute a power or a political sovereignty. 
(Foucault 2003, 13.)
In the above, the liberal-juridical idea of social contract is depicted as if stemming 
from an economic model. There is a transaction where one barters power for 
security and order. Three years later, in The birth of biopolitics lectures of 1979, 
Foucault discussed the relationship between liberal economics and the law in a 
different manner. This time, Foucault undertook to elaborate the ways in which 
economic liberalism connected with the juridical concept of power, not in terms 
of social contract, but of Rechtsstaat and the rule of law. For the purposes of 
elaborating on the liberal-juridical model of power, let us make a brief excursion 
to the themes of The birth of biopolitics, especially its seventh lecture discussing 
the Rechtsstaat. 
The basic aim of the seventh lecture was to explain how twentieth century 
economic liberalism made strategic use of the Rechtsstaat and the rule of law.1 
Whereas classic economic liberalism had instructed a way of governing societies 
that disconnected from the juridical (as a constitution of power by social 
contract), the new forms of liberalism reconnected the juridical (as principles of 
the Rechtsstaat) to the governing of society on the basis of the market. Foucault 
wanted to explain the ways in which the new economic liberalism of the twentieth 
century made strategic use of the formalism of the constitutional state.
Before discussing liberalism and the Rechtsstaat, let us however note 
Foucault’s analytical distinction between the juridical justification of governing 
and its justification by political economy. This distinction reflects the more 
general distinction between the rule of law and the general good as principles 
1 The first half of The birth of biopolitics lectures discusses German ordoliberalism 
and the second half American neo-liberalism, but in the seventh lecture, forming a 
hinge between those two halves, F.A. Hayek as an individual thinker seems to have 
been the most important source for Foucault.
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of justification. According to Foucault, when political economy reflects on 
governmental practices, 
[…] it does not question them to determine whether or not they are legitimate 
in terms of right. It considers them in terms of their effects rather than their 
origins, not by asking, for example, what authorizes a sovereign to raise taxes, 
but by asking, quite simply: What will happen if, at a given moment, we raise 
a tax […]? What matters is not whether or not this is legitimate in terms of 
law, but what its effects are and whether they are negative. (Foucault 2008, 15.)
The general good as conceived by political economy pertains to future effects of 
political action, whereas the rule of law as conceived by public lawyers pertains 
to prior authorisation of political action. ‘The economic question’, said Foucault, 
is always about ‘the real effects’ of government, whereas the juridical question is 
about the original rights and powers that have founded and defined the scope of 
someone’s rule over others, as well as the spheres of freedom that remain. Hence, 
the time dimension of the general good is future, whereas the rule of law keeps 
track of the past. (Foucault 2008, 15.)
The problem of economic liberalism was how to devise a political order in 
which there would be ‘a state under the supervision of the market rather than 
a market supervised by the state’ (Foucault 2008, 116). Such a political order 
is committed to the basic outlook according to which ‘there is only one true 
and fundamental social policy: economic growth’ (Foucault 2008, 144). What 
emerges is the problem of ‘a radically economic state’ that is completely different 
from the problem of classic liberalism. The problem of classic liberalism was the 
following: ‘given the existence of a legitimate state […], how can we limit this 
existing state, and above all, allow for the necessary economic freedom within 
it?’ In the place of that problem, the problem of the radically economic state of 
the ordoliberals was: ‘how can we get [the state] to exist on the basis of this non-
state space of economic freedom?’ (Foucault 2008, 86-86.)
[…] the problem of neo-liberalism was not how to cut out or contrive a free 
space of the market within an already given political society, as in the liberalism 
of Adam Smith and the eighteenth century. The problem of neo-liberalism 
is rather how the overall exercise of political power can be modelled on the 
principles of a market economy. So it is not a question of freeing an empty 
space, but of taking the formal principles of a market economy and referring 
and relating them to, of projecting them on to a general art of government. 
(Foucault 2008, 131.)
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So the space of economic freedom is the market and, in a radically economic state, 
one must enhance realisation of the following: what regulates the market must 
regulate political society overall. That is the way, the only true social policy, to 
public good, to economic growth. Then what is it that regulates the market? It 
is competition; therefore, competition must regulate political society overall. But 
what is competition?
Competition is an essence. Competition is an eidos. Competition is a principle 
of formalization. Competition has an internal logic; it has its own structure. 
Its effects are only produced if this logic is respected. (Foucault 2008, 120.)
What is most important here, and distinguishes the contemporary forms of 
economic liberalism from classic economic liberalism, is that the positive effects 
of the market will not come about naturally: its logic must be ‘respected’. The 
market is not a natural order that will start to execute itself when regulations are 
merely lifted. In other words, ‘the market, or rather pure competition, which is 
the essence of market, can only appear if it is produced, and if it is produced by 
active governmentality’ (Foucault 2008, 121). Classic liberalists had believed that 
things would start to develop on their own, like plants grow in nature, if only the 
governors step back and let go. Against that, the ordoliberals would say: 
Not true, the natural order, what is understood by the natural order, what the 
classical economists or, at any rate, those of the eighteenth century understood 
by a natural order, is nothing other than the effect of a particular legal order. 
(Foucault 2008, 162.)
The solution: the Rechtsstaat
Economic processes may be analysed as ‘a matter for pure theory and formalisation’ 
– as an essence, eidos, and in terms of their internal logic. Yet all of this can ‘really 
exist, in history,’ only ‘insofar as an institutional framework and positive rules 
have provided them with their conditions of possibility’ (Foucault 2008, 163). 
What the realisation of markets and competition as regulative principles of society 
requires is ‘the redefinition of the juridical institution and of the necessary rules 
of right in a society regulated on the basis of and in terms of the competitive 
market economy’ (Foucault 2008, 160). In short: ‘The juridical gives form to 
the economic, and the economic would not be what it is without the juridical’ 
(Foucault 2008, 163). A legal order gives birth to an economic order.
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In any event, liberal economics had come up against the problem of how 
to forge the institutional fabric that would allow competition as an eidos to be 
extended from the realm of the market and become the regulative principle for 
the governing of society all over. At this point, the German idea of Rechtsstaat 
is evoked. Rechtsstaat responded to the needs of economic liberalism and be-
came a constitution of a radically economic state. Rechtsstaat itself of course is 
not radically economic, but the product of eighteenth century German legal and 
political theory stemming all the way from the philosophy of Immanuel Kant 
(Stolleis 1988, 326). Nonetheless, the liberal economists saw that the doctrines 
of Rechtsstaat fit perfectly to the demands of market-society. Foucault explained 
that Rechtsstaat embodied three important doctrines for the political purposes of 
liberal economic theory. Firstly, a Rechtsstaat is … 
[…] a state in which the actions of the public authorities will have no value if 
they are not framed in laws that limit them in advance. The public authorities 
act within the framework of the law and can only act within the framework 
of the law. (Foucault 2008, 169.)
This, according to Foucault, transposes the origin and principle of the exercise of 
coercive public power from the will of the sovereign to the form of the law. This 
transposition is directed against despotism. In despotism, ‘any injunction made 
by the public authorities’ can be referred ‘back to the sovereign’s will’ (Foucault 
2008, 169).
Second, in a Rechtsstaat …
[…] there is a difference of kind, effect and origin between, on the one hand, 
laws, which are universally valid general measures and in themselves acts 
of sovereignty, and, on the other hand, particular decisions of the public 
authorities. (Foucault 2008, 169.) 
In other words, general legislation (‘legal dispositions’) is differentiated from 
individual decisions (‘administrative measures’). Foucault did not explain what 
precisely is the legal meaning and effect of this differentiation, but we know of 
course that administrative decisions must be based on laws, and general legislation 
may not be promulgated with a view to individual cases only (prohibition of 
lex individualis). Foucault explained that separation of ‘conjunctural, temporary, 
local, and individual decisions’ from the sphere of ‘general and permanent 
prescriptions’ was directed against the ‘police state’ (the nineteenth century 
Polizeistaat) that ‘establishes an administrative continuum’ between all public 
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authorities by according in principle the same coercive value to all injunctions. 
(Foucault 2008, 168.)
Thirdly, and lastly, Rechtsstaat is … 
[…] a state in which every citizen has the concrete institutional and effective 
possibility of recourse against the public authorities. […] It is a state in which 
there is a system of law, that is to say, of laws, but it also means a system of 
judicial arbitration between individuals and the public authorities. (Foucault 
2008, 170.)
In some countries, Foucault had learned, judicial review of public authorities’ 
decisions is organized in special administrative courts, while in others these 
decisions may be challenged in the same courts that deal with civil and criminal 
matters. The effective meaning of this in any case is that the law ‘binds the state 
as much as it binds others’. (Foucault 2008, 173.)
This is the concept of law that economic thinkers, before and after the 
Second World War, inserted to their way of instructing a good political order. 
Why, for what purpose, did they undertake this? Because with the Rechtsstaat the 
liberals saw the possibility of doing away with all forms of socialism. The meaning 
of the Rechtsstaat concept of law, as economic liberalism wanted to understand it, 
was to rule out the collective planning of an interventionist state. In other words, 
legislation ‘must never pursue a particular end’, but ‘must be conceived a priori 
in the form of fixed rules’. This kind of formalism makes up the social fabric of 
certainty (trust in the stability of the environment) for economic actors. Then the 
law is a fixed framework for purposive-rational action, ‘within which economic 
agents can freely make their decisions’. But it is even more: the law must exist as 
a wholesale prohibition of any further fixing that would adjust this established 
framework according to some precepts of distributive justice, sensitive to the 
social injustices that this framework might bring about. If there is a Rechtsstaat, 
agents would know that the legal framework of their action ‘will not change’, the 
framework is fixed for good. Finally, ‘the formal law’ does not leave the legislator 
itself intact (princeps legibus solutus), but it is ‘a law that binds the state as much as 
it binds others’. (Foucault 2008, 172–173.)
All in all, the Rechtsstaat concept of law, as conceived by liberal economists, 
means that legal ‘rules are not decisions which someone takes for others’ (Foucault 
2008, 173). What, then, is the law? 
It is a set of rules which determine the way in which each must play a game 
whose outcome is not known by anyone. The economy is a game and the legal 
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institution which frames the economy should be thought of as rules of the 
game. (Foucault 2008, 173.)
The government, subjected to or guided by the economic concept of the Rechtsstaat, 
is never one of the players, but ‘a provider of rules for an economic game in which 
the only players, the only real agents, must be individuals’ (Foucault 2008, 173). 
This is the way in which the Rechtsstaat forms a condition of possibility for the 
materialisation of the eidos of competition. The general good that the law will 
generate must be the outcome of its guard against any substantive policy-making 
on the basis of general good. Only formal justification, never substantive policy 
justification, counts in the practice of law. Yet it is precisely here that one should 
not miss the point of junction where economic liberalism makes its essential 
tactical manoeuvre.
The insistence of formality in the practice of law is nothing essential because 
it is nothing new. It really made no difference: formalism is the way it had been 
from before; the rationality of law is formal. This appearance of no-transforma-
tion and homogeneity, at one level (where it is a fact that nothing new has been 
introduced), is as a matter of fact the condition for enabling real transformation 
(at another level, where everything will change) induced by economic liberalism 
in its tactical use of Rechtsstaat. That transformation changes everything in the 
practice of politics.
What must be seen clearly is that while nothing new happens in the practice 
of law, the liberal economists’ filtering of Rechtsstaat doctrines pruned away the 
element of collective decision making from the practice of politics. The Rechtsstaat 
is made to mean that politics is not to intervene (in accordance with its substan-
tively justified policy-programmes for public good) in the life of individuals, life 
that should be conducted in market-relationships as competition. This is a real 
transformation, a tactical reversal of the juridico-political discourse. 
In a constitutional state, lawyers’ ideology is formalistic because they would 
regard it as the task of politicians precisely to define the general good and then act 
on that basis. What is known as a democratic constitutional state (where ‘lawmak-
ing is interwoven with the formation of communicative power’; Habermas 1996, 
162) will not do for liberal economists any better than an omnipotent absolutist 
monarch, because it might ignore or disrespect the fragile eidos of competition. 
A Rechtsstaat that is still based on the social contract (where individuals find out 
about the general will through the process of law-making) is destructive of the 
economic order because the notion of general will is incompatible with it. There 
cannot be anything but the individual will. The democratic Rechtsstaat is a patho-
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logical tendency to social disturbance – not only because it can always intrude 
relations of competition, but because of its fundamental element of collective 
will with which individuals are asked to identify and assimilate. What economic 
liberals wished to see, however, was that juridical Rechtsstaat principles pertaining 
to the practice of law become the form of government. Legal justice should be 
imposed on political justice. 
Curiously, economic liberalism, being a version of political economy, is 
nonetheless ultimately founded on a general-good type of justification. It has re-
gard to real effects in the future, which can be negative or positive. Yet the only 
true general good for economic liberalism is economic growth, and this good is 
best achieved by competition between private entrepreneurs. To facilitate com-
petition, as an eidos, one needs to make sure that politics will not get involved, 
that is, will not think about, or at any rate, will not act for the general good. The 
formal rationality of legal practice, which keeps track of the past only, is imposed 
on the practice of politics. All that society needs is formal law: it serves the fixed 
framework that facilitates free competition, but also disqualifies, banishes, the 
state from the field of economy – and thereby from the field of society overall. 
This is the way in which the liberal economists forged a conjunction be-
tween market society and constitutional state, established ‘the possible connec-
tions between disparate terms’ (Foucault 2008, 42.). In the classical versions of 
liberalism, these disparate terms were disconnected, while in the new version 
they were reconnected. Hence, the new economic thinking applied strategic logic: it 
appropriated and made use of the eighteenth century German Staatsrecht doctrines 
(and the formal, rule of law type of justification inscribed in them) in order to 
pursue their own policy of the general good. Analytically speaking, this policy 
was a strange one indeed, a kind of no-policy: it wished to impose no general good 
as the rule of law on the state. Summum bonum.
The liberal-juridical model as a war model
Economic theory appropriated and incorporated the principle of the rule of law 
in its own discourse, which was not mere theory, however, but a power game. 
This calls for two remarks with respect to the initial antagonism between the 
war model and the liberal-juridical model of power that was our starting point. 
Firstly, the liberal-juridical model of power is no longer perceived by Foucault in 
The birth of biopolitics lectures as something against which the war-model would 
be put forward as a radical alternative. The liberal-juridical model of power is 
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inserted into political struggles, which bring on tactical transmutations of that 
model. In other words, the war-model embraces the liberal-juridical model.
The second remark concerns the eidos of competition. Clearly, for Foucault, 
the Rechtsstaat was not only a piece of tactics of the liberals in their battle against 
socialism. In fact, it belonged to the more far reaching strategy of making the 
whole of society into a kind of economic battleground. This battleground was 
meant for ‘that other natural man or ideal element dreamed up by the economists: 
a man without a past or a history, who is motivated only by self-interest and who 
exchanges the product of his labor for another product’. Who is the other natural 
man? He is a savage – not the noble savage (the first natural man), the Hottentot 
that obeys the will of nature, but ‘the savage Homo economicus whose life is devoted 
to exchange and barter’. For this savage, the Rechtsstaat ‘constitutes a social body 
which is, at the same time, an economic body’. (Foucault 2003, 194).
This kind of savage is essentially free. In this respect she is no different from 
the medieval Germanic warriors, whose freedom ‘was essentially the freedom of 
egoism, of greed […] not the freedom of tolerance and equality for all’ (Foucault 
2003, 148). Now, the question is whether the economic notion of freedom more 
elementarily corresponds to the warrior notion of freedom:
The first criterion that defines [warrior’s] freedom is the ability to deprive 
others of their freedom. What would be the point of being free and what, in 
concrete terms, would it mean, if one could not trample on the freedom of 
others? That is the primary expression of freedom. (Foucault 2003, 157.)
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